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Reading active labour market policy politically: An autonomist analysis of Britain’s Work 
Programme and Mandatory Work Activity 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on Autonomist Marxist theory this article situates the 2010–15 Conservative–Liberal 
Coalition government’s active labour market policy as the most recent phase in a state ‘strategy of 
underdevelopment’ (Cleaver, 1977) to erode the autonomy of labour power and facilitate a 
reconfiguration of labour and work to impose (competition for) undesirable jobs on the terms and 
conditions offered by capital (Peck, 2001: 349). The article contends that Mandatory Work Activity 
and the Work Programme facilitate a pattern of differentiated activation, where segmentation and 
stratification of the non-employed population (re)produces an insecure, disciplined, segmented and 
stratified labour power for insecure, segmented, stratified labour markets. From the perspective of 
capital and the state the differential job outcomes associated with these programmes are less a 
mark of policy failure than of policy success 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Work first’ active labour market policies that require participants to engage in some form of 
employment related activity (e.g. job search, updating of CV (curriculum vitae), basic training, 
unwaged job placements) in exchange for benefit payments and that seek rapid reintegration into 
employment are not a new development in British social policy. The use of ‘work for your benefit’ 
type policies and contracting out of employment services for the unemployed has gradually 
developed over thirty years, from hesitant experimentation under Conservative governments of the 
1980s to enthusiastic embrace by New Labour and cross-party acceptance between 1997 and 2010 
(Peck, 2001: 332; Gash and Roos, 2012: 15). 
Until recently, however, the target for mandated participation in employment related activity in 
exchange for out of work benefit payments had been those in receipt of the UK unemployment 
benefit Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) (Clasen and Clegg, 2011). Recipients of Income Support (IS), 
typically paid to lone parents on grounds of their caring for children, or Incapacity Benefit (IB) paid to 
sick and disabled people unable to take jobs, were generally excluded from mandated participation 
and/or subject to weaker forms of activation. From 2008 changes to conditions of entitlement for IS 
and the replacement of IB with a new benefit – Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – have 
narrowed eligibility for, and strengthened the work related conditions applied to, out of work 
benefits on grounds of lone parenthood or sickness or disability. As a result many lone parents and 
sick and disabled people have been (re)categorised by the state as capable of waged work, or 
preparing for waged work (Grover and Piggott, 2010; Whitworth and Griggs, 2013). This has grown 
the portion of the out of work benefit claimant population subject to activation measures including 
mandated participation in one of the employment schemes introduced by the Conservative–Liberal 
Coalition government between 2010 and 2015 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. 
 
Select Coalition government employment schemes 2010–2015. 
 
This article critically examines two of these schemes – Mandatory Work Activity and the Work 
Programme. Mandatory Work Activity (MWA) is a relatively small scheme geared specifically to 
imposing ‘work discipline’ by directing some short term JSA claimants into ‘work for your benefit’ 
placements. The Work Programme (WP) is the Coalition’s flagship active labour market policy for 
long term JSA and ESA claimants. The WP involves the state contracting out delivery to 
(predominantly) for-profit providers, relying on a payment by results (PbR) contract to manage and 
direct provider activity to align with government policy objectives. The Coalition drew on 
experimentation with such methods by the preceding Labour government, but as discussed below 
the WP is so far the largest, most comprehensive attempt to organise labour attachment through 
financial incentives in the UK (Gash and Roos, 2012; Gash et al., 2013: 14–15). 
Yet despite the Coalition’s ostensible intentions the WP payment by results system has not led to 
substantial improvement in job outcome performance or prevented the well-known problem of 
providers concentrating resources on participants likely to secure employment (‘creaming’), whilst 
under-providing for participants with complex needs. The latter participate in the programme, but 
do so without much support (‘parking’). Neither have ‘work for your benefit’ interventions 
demonstrated much success in securing sustained employment outcomes (WPC, 2011, 2013; DWP, 
2012b; Newton et al., 2012; Rahim et al., 2012; CESI, 2014; Rees et al., 2014; Shutes and Taylor, 
2014). We might conclude the Coalition’s employment schemes are a policy failure and in need of 
modification to improve job outcomes and their capacity to serve all participants. Grover (2012: 
284–285), however, has made the pertinent point that approaching seemingly flawed activation 
policy as if it is amenable to corrective technocratic tinkering, depoliticises reform. This leaves 
questions concerning whether the ostensible policy goals are the only, or even primary objectives, 
and whether activation is desirable and for whom, underexplored. 
Utilising an analytical perspective informed by Autonomist Marxist (hereafter autonomism) theory 
this article instead reads activation reform ‘politically’, situating it as a product of evolving 
antagonistic class relations between capital and labour power (Cleaver, 1979, 1981, 1992). The 
Coalition’s employment schemes are positioned as part of a broad strategic intervention by the state 
to erode labour power autonomy in response to ‘refusals’ of poor quality jobs. If we take the 
perspective that capital and the state are committed to furthering and deepening low wage labour 
market flexibilisation then the WP and MWA are two of the latest tools developed by the British 
state to discipline labour power and organise the form, extent and pace of its reintegration into 
(competition for) jobs marked by instability and low pay (Peck, 2001: 188). When judged as 
interventions to manage labour power and buttress capital’s authority then the reforms appear to 
be working reasonably well. 
Before proceeding it is necessary to clarify that following Standing (2014: 966) the discussion makes 
a distinction between labour power, labour, and work. Labour power is used to encompass 
individuals who rely upon selling their skills, behaviour and attitudes, transforming them into a 
commodity (commodification) for purchase by capital (employers as a class interest) (Cleaver, 1979: 
69; Marx and Engels, 1985: 87; Standing, 2014). When referring to activity undertaken by labour 
power for waged work that takes place through employment in the formal/informal economy the 
term labour is used. For activity outside of employment, including unwaged caring work and 
participation in labour related activity (revising CVs, meeting job application targets) which 
reproduces labour power and hence capitalism, the term work is used (Standing, 2013: 11). 
 
Autonomist Marxism: Capitalist development, the refusal of work and class composition 
A central premise of autonomism is that, while labour is the source of labour power’s subordination 
and alienation, it also gives labour power an embedded capacity to disrupt and threaten capitalist 
social relations by fleeing the imposition of labour (Tronti, 1980: 32; Holloway, 1995; Burgmann, 
2013: 175). Labour power is not simply an object of exploitation and victimisation governed by the 
preferences and ideas of capital (Holloway, 1995: 178) but is in fact the driver for capitalist 
development (Tronti, 1980: 31; Witheford, 1994: 89; Wright, 2002). The ceaseless remaking of 
technological, economic and social relations of production is interpreted as a response to disruption 
by labour power as capital seeks at once to reduce its reliance upon labour power, whilst 
(re)imposing labour and work to foster capital accumulation (Cleaver, 1992: 114; Burgmann, 2013: 
171). Cleaver (1977: 88), for example, identifies the post-1945 Fordist class compromise as a strategy 
of development, whereby capital and the trade unions agreed to wage rises and investments in 
human capital and the social wage (better public services and more encompassing social security) 
for improvements in productivity that promoted accumulation. A strategy of underdevelopment, in 
contrast, is characterised as ‘dis-investment’ through reductions in wages and the (social) wage as 
the means to strengthen labour power’s engagement in labour and work (Cleaver, 1977: 94; Byrne, 
2005: 49). 
Under Fordism the strategy of development meant that struggles to increase wages were 
incorporated into the system as a mechanism to ratchet up rapid technical development in the 
methods of production and foster increased economic growth (Cleaver, 2012). Labour power’s 
exercise of self-activity provided the motor of capitalism, but eventually generated new tensions. 
During the 1960s–1970s waged workers increasingly rejected ‘Taylorist’ labour processes through 
wildcat strikes, go slows, absenteeism and deliberate sabotage of machinery (Sheppard and Herrick, 
1972; Benyon, 1975: 139; Aronowitz, 1992: 26) and together with the contestation of the broader 
(patriarchal) organisation of labour and work by women (Weeks, 2011), fundamentally challenged 
the authority and functioning of Fordism (Jessop, 2013). For autonomists the challenge to the class 
compromise did not arise from capital’s pursuit of neo-liberal ideas; it originated in the rejection (the 
refusal of work) of the productivist paternalism of traditional social democracy by labour power 
itself, acting autonomously from capital and trade unions (Cleaver, 1979: 39; Tronti, 2010: 187; 
Weeks, 2011; Garrett, 2014: 1698). 
 
The refusal of the Fordist class compromise by labour power provoked capital and the state to seek 
the transformation of what autonomists conceptualise as the technical class composition, and 
political class composition of labour power. The technical class composition refers to how labour 
power is stratified in relation to labour and work to fulfil particular roles under a given configuration 
of capitalist relations of (re)production (e.g. Fordism). The political class composition, meanwhile, 
incorporates how labour power’s attitudes and/or behaviour either align with interests of capital or 
foster labour solidarity, and what specific forms of organisation/action this takes (Bowman, 2012). A 
political class composition that resists the imposition of capital’s authority leads capital to pursue 
‘decomposition’ of the technical class composition, removing the foundations of labour power’s 
strength. The technical class composition of Fordism involving the full employment of the (male) 
industrial working class provided the foundation for a political class composition that enabled 
‘refusals of work’ during the 1960s and 1970s. To break the political class composition of industrial 
labour power, capital needed to (re)impose the centrality of labour and work and this involved the 
reconstitution of the reserve army of labour (Cleaver, 1977, cited in Byrne, 2005: 49). 
 
The reserve army, labour market restructuring and social security 
The concept of the active army and reserve army of labour refers to the division between people 
employed in formal waged labour and those outside of the employment relation. The active army 
includes a core who enjoy the highest levels of remuneration and job security (primary labour 
market) and a more peripheral ‘contingent’ labour force employed for lower wages working in more 
insecure jobs (secondary labour market) (Peck, 2001: 42–43). Similarly, the reserve army is also 
stratified; it encompasses waged workers made redundant by technological developments and the 
business cycle, but who remain close to the labour market (the floating segment); labour power that 
could be drawn into employment from non-waged activity (the latent segment); and people 
perceived to be unlikely to take waged work because of impairment, sickness or age (the stagnant 
segment) (Marx, 2013: 448–451). The reserve army provides a supply of labour to direct to emerging 
growth areas as capital periodically absorbs, dismisses and (re)forms the reserve army in the 
expansion and contraction of economic growth. It also disciplines labour power with the active 
army, understanding the reserve army to exist as potential substitute workers, encouraging 
moderation of demands for improved terms and conditions of employment (Gough, 1981: 26; 
Grover, 2003: 19; Byrne, 2005: 42). How an individual is positioned in relation to participation in, and 
the queue for, waged work and who is assigned to what type of (re)productive labour is structured 
by social divisions relating to gender, age, educational qualifications, disability and ethnicity. 
Historically women and disabled people along with minority ethnic groups have been under-
represented in the core labour force and over-represented in secondary labour markets (active 
army) and the reserve army, giving rise to divisions and inequalities within labour power that capital 
exploits (Post, 2006). 
From an autonomist perspective the de-industrialisation of Britain’s economy and remaking of the 
technical class composition of Fordist labour was a deliberate political move by capital enacted in 
response to labour power. Through economic and labour market restructuring capital discharged 
one set of (male industrial) labour power into the reserve army, while simultaneously drawing on a 
portion of labour power previously consigned to the reserve army to take job opportunities in the 
post-industrial service economy (Cleaver, 1981: 114; Negri, 1988: 107; see also Schmidt, 2011). This 
has opened up new employment options, but the labour market remains a site of social stratification 
and segmentation that harnesses and reproduces social division. Women’s employment 
participation rate, for example, has increased from 53% in 1971 to 67% in 2013, but remains below 
that of men at 76%, while women make up a disproportionate number of employees in low paid 
sectors, such as caring (82%), customer services (63%) and administration (77%). A greater 
proportion of employed working age women (42%) are also employed in part-time jobs than 
employed working age men (12%) (ONS, 2013: 1). Similarly, employment participation of working 
age disabled people reached 46.3% in 2012, suggesting that whilst participation remains 
substantially below the rate for non-disabled people (76.4%), the historical exclusion of disabled 
people from employment is weakening (Barnes and Mercer, 2005: 536; DWP/ODI, 2014). Yet rising 
participation in employment has not eliminated labour market inequalities. A higher proportion of 
disabled people than non-disabled people at equivalent levels of qualifications continue to 
experience low pay. (MacInnes et al., 2014: 33). 
The rapid pace of economic and employment change during the 1980s and 1990s reconstituted the 
reserve army and broke the strength of labour power, but this generated new problems for capital 
as these changes outpaced government reforms of social security and labour market institutions. 
Activists from within the autonomist tradition, for example, have suggested that the removal of 
labour power’s refusal of work from industry through mass unemployment transferred the refusal of 
work to the social security system. The availability of unemployment benefit and other out of work 
benefits effectively provided the means for a portion of labour power to live outside the 
employment relation and supported some individuals to engage in political activity against the state 
(Aufheben UK, 2007: 2). To simplify, this was possible because of the lag in adapting a social security 
system that had evolved with Fordism after 1945. This was grounded in comparably stable full 
employment and occupational careers for male labour power and the hierarchical subordination and 
relative exclusion from employment of women and disabled people, segmenting and stratifying 
labour power. The structure of social security reflected this division of labour power and pattern of 
employment. Those individuals capital and state deemed economically inactive claimants were not 
subject to the employment-seeking requirements of unemployment benefit recipients (Dostal, 2008: 
31). Meanwhile unemployment benefit included a greater role (albeit limited) for contributions-
based entitlement and provision to impose restrictions on types of employment sought. Until the 
replacement of the Unemployment Benefit by Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996, unemployed labour 
power for example was subject to considerably weaker job search conditions and levels and duration 
of benefit sanctions (Harris, 2008: 54; Clasen and Clegg, 2011) than currently pertain. Similarly the 
most significant curtailment of entitlement and imposition of work related conditionality to the 
‘inactive’ benefits IS and ESA (previously Incapacity Benefit) have only come into play since 2008. 
Temporal misalignment between the creation of a low wage flexible labour market and the reform 
of existing policy to maximise labour power re-commodification essentially left a ‘crack’ in capitalism 
that enabled labour power to exercise autonomy and evade (however partial and imperfect) the 
domination of capital (see Holloway, 2010). 
 
The refusal of undesirable labour 
Labour power has repeatedly expressed a questioning of successive governments’ dictum that taking 
any low paid, insecure job is better than not being employed and indicated a willingness to attach 
caveats to their availability for labour. A survey commissioned by the Department for Work and 
Pensions of their low income ‘customer base’ (DWP, 2011), for example, records that 17% of the 
survey respondents (whom the authors label Determined Seekers) reported a willingness to take any 
job. To varying degrees most other active job seeking respondents (judged according to hours of 
active job search) were wary about making themselves available for ‘any job’. Meanwhile, over one-
fifth (22%) of respondents expressed opposition to employment on grounds of benefits being better, 
or being focused on the home (often this reflected caring responsibility) (DWP, 2011). Other 
research also indicates that labour power has not fully internalised the message from successive 
British governments that all employment, irrespective of terms and conditions is superior to 
receiving out of work benefits. Barnes and Tomaszewski’s (2010: 208) survey of non-employed lone 
mother recipients of Income Support reported that, while a plurality of respondents expressed 
agreement that any job was better than no job (42%), this was rejected by a large minority (33%). 
Lindsay and McQuaid’s (2004: 311) survey of unemployed people found 51% of respondents willing 
to rule out employment in call centres, 38% willing to rule out working in the retail sector and 41% 
willing to rule out work in the hospitality sector. The strongest ‘resisters’ to jobs in retail and 
hospitality were typically male, aged over 25, less confident in their interpersonal skills, lacking 
previous experience in the sector and holding to a higher reservation wage (Lindsay and McQuaid, 
2004: 307). Ray et al. (2009: 982) similarly detected resistance amongst older skilled workers to 
policy interventions that sought to activate them into low paid unskilled jobs. Giazitzoglu’s (2014) 
qualitative study of unemployed men identifies various dispositions towards paid work, but with a 
subset of those studied (the drifters) expressing vigorous antagonism towards participation in paid 
work, a contentment with life in receipt of social security and willingness to recount the active 
evasion of job search requirements. Giazitzoglu (2014: 345) concludes the active refusal of work 
amongst this group is a pragmatic response to their few skills and, at best, precarious employment. 
Dunn’s (2010a, 2010b) qualitative research into attitudes towards employment also indicates that 
whilst some JSA claimants were in search of even poor quality jobs, others expressed a preference 
for ‘dole to drudgery’ (Dunn, 2010a: 11). Dunn acknowledges that constraints on employment, 
including the availability of job vacancies can and do affect capacity to take up paid work, but the 
point being made is that the stated preferences and behaviour of some claimants indicate a more 
circumspect attitude toward paid work than is often implied in mainstream social policy analysis 
(Dunn et al., 2014). My intention is not to suggest claimants are feckless individuals, or are 
expressing a radical rejection of employment, but to draw attention to labour power’s autonomous 
questioning of the demand they make themselves available for all existing job vacancies. Whether or 
not enough jobs exist, the point is that capital’s authority and Britain’s economy rests upon the 
imposition of this less desirable labour (Cleaver, 2012). It consequently falls to the state to ensure 
labour power is compelled to labour, or to engage in work for labour necessary to impose discipline 
and bring labour power into competition for such jobs (Standing, 2014). 
 
Labour activation, low wage work and economic strategy 
The incremental curtailment of eligibility and strengthening of work related conditionality attached 
to working age out of work benefits under the Conservative governments of the 1990s and Labour 
governments of the 1990s and 2000s (Peck, 2001; Clasen and Clegg, 2011), reflect a gradual closure 
of social security benefits as a route to sustaining oneself outside of the employment relation and 
hence as a source of labour power autonomy. As Byrne (2005: 47) has argued, the focus on 
‘exclusion’ from paid work is not because those excluded are marginal to production, but because 
their integration into a cycle of poor jobs–no jobs is essential to capitalist authority and 
accumulation in the UK variant of post-Fordism. Exclusion from employment is perceived to diminish 
‘job readiness’, eroding the usefulness of the reserve army as a source of labour for employers and 
weakening its disciplinary effect on those in employment. New Labour’s reforms, for example, were 
premised on the notion that long term JSA claimants and claimants of IS and IB were detached from 
the labour market and hence competition for jobs (they had ceased to be part of the effective supply 
of labour) (Grover, 2003). In response, the state promoted a combination of support and 
conditionality to reshuffle the stock of unemployed and economically inactive claimants – the goal 
being to draw a portion of claimants into the ‘floating’ segment of the reserve army, able to 
compete for low wage jobs (Grover, 2003; Byrne, 2005: 73). 
From 2008 a more aggressive strategy to ratchet up the mobilisation of lone parent IS claimants and 
those in receipt of IB began to be pursued, through the strengthening of work related requirements 
attached to benefits and a narrowing of conditions of entitlements. Over the course of 4 years 
access to IS on grounds of lone parenthood was progressively curtailed so that now only those lone 
parents with a youngest dependant aged under 5 years qualify. Lone parents with older children 
must now take jobs or claim JSA (Whitworth and Griggs, 2013). Meanwhile IB has been replaced by 
the ESA which applies a stricter test of work-limiting disability or illness with the result that many 
applying for ESA end up on JSA. Those who qualify for ESA face further assessment resulting in 
categorisation into either the Support Group (SG) or Work Related Activity Group (WRAG). The SG is 
intended to cover those whose condition is severe and/or long term and are exempt from 
employment and work related activity. The WRAG (covering the majority) is for people assessed as 
temporarily incapable of paid work and as such are positioned as being on a journey back into 
employment and required to engage in job preparation activity. The drawing more tightly of the 
circumstances under which claimants are not expected to participate in job related activity means 
distinctions previously drawn between unemployed and ‘inactive’ labour power are collapsing 
(Clasen and Clegg, 2011). At the same time this reform is simultaneously facilitating a more refined 
sorting of the newly activated into those capital deems to be more or less employable (Grover and 
Piggott, 2010). 
We are witnessing a strategy of underdevelopment as the means for achieving differential re-
commodification so as to recast the composition of non-employed and employed labour power. The 
intensification of this trend under the Coalition cannot be separated from what Berry (2014: 606) 
characterises as the UK government’s attempt to stabilise and re-embed an Anglo-liberal model of 
growth that rests on high levels of consumption, rising house prices, debt and a low wage labour 
intensive service sector. The long term project of eroding labour power’s autonomy to facilitate 
capital accumulation is aligned with government commitment to ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’. 
This economic strategy is premised upon using monetary policy to offset reductions in demand 
brought about by public spending restraint. The presumption is a low interest rate reduces the cost 
of debt and the incentive to save. This encourages a rise in personal consumption and borrowing for 
investment by business while making British exports more competitive internationally (Baker, 2010: 
5). The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – Iain Duncan Smith MP – and the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England have themselves linked Coalition activation reforms to grow the 
labour supply with the scope the Bank has to maintain a 0.5% interest rate (Duncan Smith, 2014; 
Bank of England, 2014: 7–9). Active labour market policy is positioned as integral to sustaining a low 
interest rate and renewing capital accumulation by supporting the expansion of low paid and 
atypical forms of employment (Lallement, 2011: 635) that have grown in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. 
Between 2008 and 2014, for example, the number of people employed part-time increased by 
almost 9% and self-employment rose by 18%, whilst full-time employment largely stagnated (Wilson 
and Bivand, 2014: 4). Zero hours contracts that provide no guarantee of employment have also 
gained prominence as capital has expanded the use of labour power at the periphery to meet 
shifting demands and avoid the costs associated with the ‘core’ labour force. The Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development has suggested 1 million people are on zero hour contracts, whilst the 
Office for National Statistics estimates 583,000 employees were on zero hour contracts at the end of 
2013 (ONS, 2014a: 3; Pyper and McGuinness, 2014: 4). For many individuals low wage jobs are a trap 
from which they cannot escape. Analysis of pay progression between 2002 and 2012 indicates that 
27% of people starting on low wages during this period remained low paid throughout, whilst 46% 
who successfully secured higher pay were unable to sustain this and cycled back into low pay by 
2012 (Hurrell, 2013: 16). In addition, between April 2009 and April 2014 the value of wages eroded 
as wage increases have been outpaced by rises in both the Consumer Price Index and Retail Price 
Index rate of inflation (ONS, 2014b: 18). In caring and sales occupations, for example, median 
earnings increased by only 1.1% and 1.5% respectively between 2011 and 2013, much lower than 
the 6.4% rise in the Retail Price Index during this period (Wilson and Bivand, 2014: 47). Overall the 
trajectory of Britain’s post-industrial labour market indicates the number of well paid jobs involving 
routine, but skilled work has experienced relative stagnation, with employment growth 
concentrated in the expansion of low paid jobs that require few specialist skills (which can be done 
by most people) and (smaller growth) high paid jobs that require what capital deems higher (more 
scarce) skills (DBIS, 2013: 7–11; Wilson and Bivand, 2014: 11). We now turn our attention to two of 
the Coalition’s employment schemes whose purpose is to foster labour power’s willingness to take 
any job. 
 
Directing labour power to labour in the low wage service sector 
Introduced in 2011, Mandatory Work Activity (MWA) is targeted at JSA claimants prior to their 
reaching the point at which they become eligible for the Work Programme. MWA gives staff of the 
public employment service – Jobcentre Plus – the option to mandate JSA claimants into a work 
placement (sourced by contracted providers) lasting 30 hours per week for 4 weeks. Reasons for 
MWA referral are subjective, resting on the advisor’s perception of the claimant’s attitude and 
capabilities – including whether the client lacks recent work experience, enthusiasm for speculative 
job search, has unrealistic employment expectations, poor punctuality and weak understanding of 
job search support (House of Lords, 2011: 5). Claimants who refuse or fail to complete a placement 
may receive a 13-week benefit sanction (first refusal) or 26-week sanction (second refusal) (DWP, 
2011). Although MWA is a niche programme, with fewer than 5000 claimants per month starting a 
placement between May 2011 and August 2013 (DWP, 2014c: 4), it strengthens the overall ‘threat’ 
effect of the broader activation environment. The ‘threat’ of mandated activity into unwaged labour 
is a key feature of workfare schemes as the intention is to both reduce the flow into out of work 
benefits and accelerate the departure of the most employable who are claiming (Mead, 1997: 66). 
MWA shows how the state is reshaping provision to prevent labour power utilising social security as 
a means to exercise some discretion over job entry, even in the short term. Indeed government’s 
‘critical success factors’ for MWA make this plain. These include inculcation of the disciplines 
associated with employment, enforcing compliance with JSA job search requirements and the 
diversion of claimants from benefit (DWP, 2014d: 6). 
An evaluation of the early stages of the MWA programme in 2011 suggested those referred to MWA 
were 5 percentage points less likely to be in receipt of JSA after 10 weeks than a matched group of 
non-referrals. For referrals who did not start a placement they were 12 percentage points less likely 
be in receipt of JSA at 10 weeks and 64% of non-starters had ceased to claim JSA. After 21 weeks, 
however, there was no difference in the proportion of MWA referrals and non-referrals in receipt of 
benefit. This suggests that MWA does not prevent social security claims entirely but functions to 
regulate access in such a way as to accelerate labour market transitions (DWP, 2012a: 46) in keeping 
with existing patterns of labour market segmentation and stratification. From the MWA data alone 
we cannot draw firm conclusions as to where non-starters go. Some may continue claiming JSA and 
be sanctioned, some may continue to claim JSA and not be sanctioned, whilst others will have signed 
off JSA. Nonetheless the patterning of non-starts does suggest MWA participation is structured by 
social divisions. Claimants with characteristics associated with greater disadvantage in the labour 
market for example, are more likely to go on to start a placement after referral. Only 9% of total 
referrals to MWA have been for those aged 50+, but 49% go on to start a placement compared to 
40% of the 25–49 age group and 36% of 18–24 year olds. A higher proportion of referred claimants 
with a self-identified disability (42%) compared to those without (38%) also go on to start a 
placement (Figure 1), while overall a greater portion of male referrals (62%) than female referrals 
(55%) do not start their MWA placement. Research on the type of placements and activity 
undertaken by MWA participants indicates the scheme is predominantly oriented to developing the 
soft skills and job ‘discipline’ valued in low wage customer service and care jobs, with early 
evaluation of the MWA recording the majority of placements located in charity shops (DWP, 2012b: 
36). Moreover, a higher proportion of women were placed in retail activity than men and a higher 
proportion of women and younger participants were engaged in customer service work (DWP, 
2012b: 42). 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Mandatory Work Activity referral and starts May 2011–August 2013. 
 
Source: DWP (2013a: 5, Table 2). 
 
The 45% of participants who reported learning new skills identified ‘skills’ typically associated with 
service work (social skills, working as a team, customer relations, confidence, communication) (DWP, 
2012b: 46). MWA is explicitly a disciplinary and propaganda tool to communicate to labour power in 
general the necessity of compliance with seeking and taking up any paid work. From an autonomist 
perspective MWA is a strategy of underdevelopment intended to promote and organise 
differentiated labour attachment. By reducing JSA claimants’ capacity to exercise autonomy the 
state fosters voluntary exit, whether this is into formal or informal employment is unclear. Though 
the enhanced capacity of the state to rapidly propel labour power back into labour (Peck and 
Theodore, 2000) supports further informalisation of jobs (Standing, 2014) in the formal secondary 
labour market. For those who participate in MWA, its ‘training’ function is limited to crafting more 
amenable claimants willing and able to adopt the behaviour to compete for low waged service 
sector jobs. MWA reinforces the ‘work first’ message and imposes labour discipline at the margins of 
the claimant population, potentially generating direct small additional transitions into the floating 
segment of the reserve army (peripheral, precarious labour power). 
 
The Work Programme: Economic rationality and differential activation 
The Work Programme is similarly promoting a sifting of a labour supply engorged by the activation 
reforms to lone parent and sickness and disability benefits discussed above. The Work Programme is 
delivered across Britain in 18 Contract Package Areas (CPAs) by ‘Prime Providers’ who hold one or 
more of 40 contracts (2–3 Primes per CPA). It represents the most sophisticated application yet of 
market rationality to structure contracted-out return to work services. The premise is that financial 
signals can align the interests of contracted-out providers with the objectives of the state to deliver 
tailored and effective return to work interventions for the ‘job ready’ and individuals deemed by the 
state to be less employable (Gash and Roos, 2012). Whether this occurs or not rests on the 
effectiveness of two innovative aspects of the Work Programme – the Payment by Results (PbR) and 
Differential Pricing (DP) systems (Rees et al., 2014). The PbR system organises payments into four 
categories: a payment for attachment of a claimant to the programme (this ceased in April 2014 − 
see Table 2); a payment for securing a claimant job outcome; a payment for sustaining the job 
outcome; and an incentive payment for exceeding by 30% a non-intervention level of performance 
(job outcomes the government expect to occur in the absence of the WP) (Table 2). Though Prime 
Providers are rewarded for job outcomes sustained, they are not specifically rewarded for clients’ 
achievement of continuous full-time jobs – job outcomes can be part-time and involve one or more 
period of employment/unemployment over the duration of the 2-year client attachment to a 
provider (DWP, 2014b; NAO, 2014). This is commensurate with creating a flexibilised labour force, 
rapidly cycling through low wage service jobs or transitions between low and no wages. 
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Table 2. 
 
Summary of Work Programme Payment by Results model. 
 
PbR is ostensibly to encourage continuous performance improvements over the course of the 
contract. The attachment fee that providers claim in year 1 for each participant they take on, 
decreases in value each subsequent year and from year 4 ceases to be paid, shifting contracts to 
100% outcome based. The amount a provider can secure for each payment element varies 
depending on the type of claimant, with programme caseload separated into nine payment groups 
linked to social security benefit and personal characteristics (Differential Pricing). Higher fees are 
attached to payment groups deemed likely to contain participants with more severe health 
problems, impairments and/or long term absence from employment (Figure 2). The Department for 
Work and Pensions’ analysis of past employment scheme performance was used to set a Minimum 
Performance Level (MPL) requiring providers to achieve performance 10% higher than non-
intervention for each year of the contract for three of the nine payment groups (JSA 18–24; JSA 25+; 
and ESA Work Related Activity Group, fit for work in 3 months) (Table 2). The National Audit Office 
described these figures as optimistic (NAO, 2012: 6), and analysis by the Centre for Economic and 
Social Inclusion suggested that the minimum performance levels were equivalent to the highest ever 
achieved under Labour’s New Deals for Young People and over 25s (Work and Pensions Committee: 
2011: 33). Not only did the government set demanding targets (see NAO, 2012); in order to drive 
down the value of contracts further it allowed bidding organisations to discount against the fees set, 
reducing the fees government would have to pay a provider. Rather than an unfortunate side effect, 
the practice of creaming and parking between and within payment groups in the WP (see below) is a 
consequence of the financial incentives built into the commissioning and performance model. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Work Programme Differential Pricing model. 
 
Source: Work and Pensions Committee (2013: 29). 
 
First, the incentive for moving clients from particular payment groups into employment is lower than 
the headline figures (Figure 2) suggest, as they do not reflect that a provider will move fewer ESA 
clients into employment than JSA clients. The actual average value of each ESA claimant moved into 
sustained employment is lower than the single unit value as this excludes the cost of supporting 
unsuccessful ESA clients. The Institute for Public Policy Research calculates that moving a New ESA 
payment group client into employment is actually worth £386, which compares poorly with £852 per 
JSA 25+ or £903 per JSA 18–24 participant (Davies and Raikes, 2014: 12). The economic rationality of 
the PbR and DP incentivises providers to accelerate the re-entry of those claimants capital deems 
‘most employable’ and this is happening. Analysis of the proportion of participants joining the Work 
Programme in December 2012 who secured a job within 12 months indicated that about 5% of the 
New ESA group were successful compared to about 15% for the JSA 18–24 year olds and just under 
this for the JSA 25+ (Davies and Raikes, 2014: 9–10). There is also evidence that differential pricing 
according to payment group has permitted creaming and parking within payment groups. Prime 
Providers are conducting their own assessments using a Green (job ready), Amber (some assistance 
required), Red (little or no support) system for classification of clients and allocation of resources 
(Newton et al., 2012: 111; Rees et al., 2014: 229). Rees et al. (2014: 233), for example, found 
participants with a self-reported disability, irrespective of payment group had weaker job outcomes 
than those without. 
The Work Programme is not so much reducing labour market stratification as reproducing it. We 
should not surmise this means DP is ineffective, rather that it helps realise different objectives. The 
Work Programme was introduced in the context of austerity and a weak labour market by a 
government determined to embed a low cost work first quasi-market of large for-profit providers. To 
make the income of providers overly dependent on outcomes for the least employable of their 
clients in these circumstances would have risked provider stability while reducing the speed at which 
more employable participants were reattached to jobs. In giving providers scope to cream and park 
within and between payment groups the DP and PbR enabled the government to ramp up the 
reattachment of employable labour power for the vacancies that exist, while driving down the cost 
of the programme (NAO, 2014) without calling the viability of the quasi-market into question. 
In the aftermath of the 2008–09 recession business was already able to draw upon the under-
employed and the cyclically unemployed (ONS, 2012). Through shuffling and sifting activated non-
employed labour power, the WP and MWA, along with other employment schemes, help manage 
transitions into employment and into the floating segment of the reserve army of labour in support 
of further labour market flexibilisation and labour power commodification. Even participants who 
are parked are only temporarily demobilised, as upon exiting the WP they enter the Help to Work 
scheme which includes either state directed work activity or a Community Work Placement (similar 
to MWA). The latter is organised into the same 18 CPAs as used for the WP and almost one-third of 
the Community Work Placement contracts have gone to Prime Providers already delivering return to 
work services in that WP CPA (McGuinness, 2014: 7). 
 
Conclusions: Differentiated underdevelopment 
Grover (2012) has suggested that the contemporary activation reforms involve a process of ‘active 
proletarianisation’ whereby the income of labour power is made increasingly dependent upon either 
low wage labour or its willingness to engage in work for labour that prepares it to compete for such 
jobs. Drawing on autonomist theory this article provides a complementary analysis of the role played 
by key employment schemes under the Coalition government. The MWA and WP function as an 
integral part of a broader strategy of underdevelopment adopted by the state as the means to erode 
labour power’s autonomy over waged work in response to labour power’s contestation that any job 
is better than no job. Importantly the schemes also organise how labour power is (re)connected to 
the labour market. 
The expansion of ‘work for your benefit’ schemes, contracting out to for-profit providers and use of 
relatively sophisticated systems of financial incentives provide a new institutional framework for 
processing and sifting a labour supply expanded by working age benefits reforms. Mandatory Work 
Activity is perhaps the clearest example in the UK of the practice, common in workfare, of applying a 
threat of mandatory activity to raise the velocity of employment/unemployment transitions, 
reducing the duration of benefit claims and accelerating caseload reduction (Peck and Theodore, 
2000: 120). The Work Programme is ostensibly about securing job outcomes across a diverse body of 
non-employed labour power using economic rationality to drive performance. Analysts rightly point 
out that contracting out and the new market structure, however, have not eliminated creaming of 
the more employable and parking of the least employable. Carter and Whitworth (2015) have 
suggested that inadvertently built into the WP were ‘perverse’ incentives to focus on the job ready 
that the PbR and DP mechanisms were intended to mitigate. The autonomist perspective outlined 
here, however, suggests this is less an oversight than an unstated function of a scheme embedded in 
antagonistic class relations. Creaming and parking are explicable as components of the state’s 
pursuit of differentiated activation to (re)produce insecure, segmented, stratified labour power for a 
labour market restructured to align with the Coalition’s preferred economic strategy (Berry, 2014) 
and capital’s long term authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Select Coalition Government employment schemes 2010-2015 
Programme Participants Participation Entry and Duration  Contracted out 
Work Experience  JSA 18-24 Voluntary. Withdrawal now permitted after 7 days  
 
Entry permitted at 3 
months.  25-30 hours 
per week for 2-8 weeks  
No. Jobcentre Plus administers/ matches clients 
to placement  
Mandatory Work 
Activity  
JSA claimants Mandatory if directed by employment service provider 
 
 
Entry permitted after 
13 weeks. 30 hours per 
week for 4 weeks 
Yes. 11 contract Package Areas each with a 
‘Prime Provider’ 
Work Trials Available to 
JSA/ ESA/ IS  
Voluntary. Participants given trial for vacancy and keep benefits (+ 
expenses). Lasts up to 30 days. Employer decides whether to keep 
the participant on 
 
Entry after 6 months for 
JSA. Immediate 
eligibility for other 
claimants 
No. Jobcentre Plus administers 
Sector based 
academies  
JSA and ESA 
WRAG 
Voluntary but failure to continue may lead to sanction. Involves 
specific business sector training, 6 weeks work experience with 
guaranteed job interview. Participant receives benefits and 
expenses 
 
Any point prior to 
referral to Work 
Programme 
DWP led. Joint funding with Skills Funding 
Agency of training delivered by external 
organisations 
Help to Work JSA Mandatory. Three strands: Community Work Placement (6 months 
unpaid); daily sign on at JCP; JCP intensive support 
Entry after completion 
of Work Programme 
Intensive support and daily signing = no  
Community Work Placement = yes. 18 Contract 
Package Areas with single provider 
Source: DWP (2013a) McGuiness (2014) Dar and Watson (2015) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Work Programme Payment by Results model 
Source: author compilation of DWP (2013b; 2014a); NAO (2012; 2014); McGuiness and Dara (2015) 
Figure 2. Work Programme Differential Pricing model 
 
Source: Work and Pensions Committee* (2013: 29) 
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Job Outcome fee  
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Incentive fee 
Attachment fee 
Providers to achieve performance 10% above ‘non-intervention’ level for PG 1; 2 & 6. 
Payable after employment for a specific period (varies by group). 
Payable every four weeks where client maintains employment (duration varies by group). 
Performance 30% above ‘non-intervention’ level.  
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Participant choice 
5 years. 18 Prime Providers (responsible for managing supply chain of sub-contractors). 40 Contract Package Areas each with 2- 3 Primes. 
No.  Government department can re-allocate caseload between Primes in a CPA in light of performance.   
Figure 1. Mandatory Work Activity Referral and Starts May 2011- August 2013 
 
Source:  DWP (2013a: 5, Table 2)  
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